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ABSTRACT
Lack of adequate accounting control of high value secondary aero-
nautical items has been a prime subject of many reports on inventory
management in the Military Departments. The importance of special man-
agement of high value items has long been recognized. However, until
recently, accounting control of high value assets was not given the man-
agement attention required in effective overall inventory management
systems. As a result, some extremely complex, expensive, and sophisi-
cated inventory management systems have proved less than satisfactory
due to a lack of accurate asset knowledge as input. Accounting control
for high value assets, as discussed herein, is the means for providing
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ITHE PROBLEM AND DEFINITION OF TERMS USED
The ever-increasing costs of today' s modern weapon systems with
concomitant increase in the costs of tho major supporting spares
and components for these systems have created an impact on the
national economy which is approaching that of the military ex-
penditures for World War Two. Defense spending in the aggregate
(including nuclear weaponry) is now taking 60$ of the entire
federal revenue.!
All of the Military Departments have realized the foregoing fact of life
for some time, and have developed inventory management systems designed
to achieve cost reductions through special management of certain high
cost supporting spare parts for today's weapon systems. The precise im-
pact of any specific inventory management program in a field as dynamic
and complex as the supply support of today* s weapon systems Is difficult
to assess. This is because of the complex mix of factors, tangible and
intangible, which affect the operation and efficiency of the sophisti-
cated inventory management programs the Military Departments employ in
their ever-growing battle against costs.
1. PROBLEM
Statement of the problem . It Is the purpose of this paper to
examine several of the inventory management programs which have been de-
veloped for management of items designated in various ways as high-value
items. In particular the study will examine systems of asset control,
if any, employed in these management programs by the Navy, Air Force,
and Army. In addition the study will examine the process of development
^Charles J. V. Murphy, "The Desperate Drive to Reduce Defense
Spending," Fortune, (January, 1964), P. 65.

of an asset control system at the U.S. Navy Aviation Supply Office.
Scope of the study . This study will be limited to the aeronautical
segment of inventory. This limitation has been made because the bulk of
money value of the Department of Defense secondary item inventory is in-
vested in aeronautical material. Inventory in the Navy Department, for
example, can be classified by the remarks of RADM Howard F. Kuehl in an
address made at the U.S. Navy Postgraduate School, March 1964, in which
he said, "The Aviation Supply Supply Office manages an aeronautical in-
ventory valued at $2.3 billion out of a total Navy Inventory Control
Point managed inventory of $3.5 billion." Auditing and review groups
are well aware that better than 65$ of Navy Inventory Control Point in-
ventory is invested in aeronautical material and have guided their ac-
tions accordingly.
Importance of the Study . Special and/or selective management of
certain inventory segments has for several years been posed as one of
the best ways to reduce dollars invested in inventory. This general
recognition of ways and means to reduce investment in inventory has nearly
always depended on a centralized data collection point where men and ma-
chines converge on the data, as collected, and make judgements based
thereon in regard to procurement, repair, redistribution, disposal, etc.
The validity of the data collected and used has always been questionable.
There has been a general lack of real knowledge of assets in all of the
Military Departments. This has been primarily due to failures in the
data collection and in the systems for control of assets. Valid asset
data is an absolute prerequisite for the success of any inventory man-
agement system for high-value material. All too often inventory managers
have failed to provide this first and most important ingredient of their

inventory management system. In this study an attempt was made to deter-
mine what makes asset control systems work, or fail to work.
2. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
Words and/or terms unique to this study will be defined at the time
of their first use in the study. This is neccessitated because of the
lack of common usage among the Military Departments. Accordingly, each





Past reviews of aeronautical support have identified numerous in-
adequacies in the area of management and control of high-value spare
parts within the Navy Department. Reviews of the Aviation Supply Office
(ASO) have been conducted by almost everyone in government. The reviews
made by the General Accounting Office (GAO) have been the most numerous,
and have probably received the most publicity. These reviews can be
classed as representative, although generally much more detailed , of all
reviews of management of aeronautical support agencies in the Military
Departments
.
A predominate criticism through-out nearly all reviews has been the
failure to account for material , in other words lack of control. For ex~
ample, GAO specifically cites 745 AN/APN-22/117 radar sets valued at
$1,534,700 as being unaccounted for in a I960 review of Navy electronics
items. In a 1961 review of the aviation segment of the Navy Supply Sys-
tem GAO says in part,
Our review of the supply management of naval aviation par+-s
and assemblies disclosed significant weaknesses which adversely
affect the economy and efficiency of these supply operations.
As a result of the weaknesses the Navy was buying millions of
dollars worth of aviation assemblies and parts and incurring
other costs that would not have been necessary if more effective
supply management practices had been followed. —-We found that
the Navy could not account for aviation assemblies and equipment
valued at $48 million which should have been a part of its stock
on hand. We further found that the Navy had made recent purchases
Auditing Division, Report on Review of Supply Management of Electronic




of some of these items, totaling nearly $12 million, in quantities
that were equal to or exceeded the quantities of these items that
were not accounted for by the Navy. We have concluded from our
review that the Navy cannot currently account for several hundred
million dollars worth of the items it has purchased and that a sub-
stantial amount of unnecessary buying has occured which would not
have been necessary if these stocks had been located. We are
recommending centralized control over such items. -— Our review
disclosed that actual or planned overbuying had resulted from use
of invalid information in predicting needs. We found overstate-
ments of quantities owed to using units aggregating $23 million
which supply departments at naval air stations had reported to
ASO. Our tests of selected overstatements, totaling $740,000,
involving items that the ASO had bought, or was buying, disclosed
that actual or planned overbuying aggregating $344,000 had resulted.
We also found that ASO's failure to detect errors and oversights
in its predictions of needs had resulted in actual or planned
overbuying in the amount of $1,070,000. —-We are recommending
that improved procedures be adopted for review of predictions of
needs .3
Again in 1962 GA0 reported to Congress that the centralized in-
ventory records maintained by ASO are inadequate for use in determing
what quantities of high value "repairable assemblies and equipment" should
4
be purchased. By this time the GA0 reviews are beginning to sound repi-
titious. As in I960 and 1961 GA0 cites results of reviews of selected
aeronautical secondary items. And again they find that Navy records at
ASO do not include quantities of items which should have been carried in
Navy assets. This review constituted less than 1 per cent of the "repair-
able assemblies and equipment" managed by ASO, but represented about 7
percent of the $950 million value of these stocks. On the basis of this
sample, GA0 took the position that additional "repairable assemblies and
3
Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress
of the United States on Review of Selected Activities of the Aviation
Segment of the Navy Supply System
.
Washington'.s 196^1, pp. 2-3.
^Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress
of the United States on Review of the Supply Management of High-Value
Repairable Aviation Assemblies and Equipment Within the Department of
the Navy
.
(Washington! 1962) pp. 1-2.

equipment" worth several hundred million dollars which should be in Navy-
stocks were not shown on its records and that a substantial amount of un-
necessary procurement has resulted from lack of control over these items
as well as those in the sample.
The Navy position on such reviews, as late as June 1962, was that
the findings did point out a need for improved inventory management but
that they did not indicate general deficiencies to the extent indicated-*
»
As a result the Navy proposed to strengthen its then existing inventory
management programs but did not propose to make any basic changes in its
inventory management methods to deal with the problems disclosed by GAO
reviews
.
We do not believe that the proposed improvements in the Navy"
s
inventory management programs provide the accounting control
necessary to keep account (italics not in the original) of the
quantities and locations of its stocks of high-value repairable
assemblies and equipment. Therefore, we are recommending that
the Department of the Navy undertake certralised .ionitoring of
the accounting for stocks of these items and otner related measures
to provide more effective control over its stocks of high-value
repairable assemblies and equipment.
°
It is interesting to note that the 1962 review is the first one in which
GAO took a strong position for a system of centralized control for selec-
ted items. For the first time GAO formally recommended that for high-
value items, because of their significant position in the total inventory,
the Navy should employ special controls; controls that could not be econ-
omically applied to low-value items.





the ASO intensify controls over stocks of high-value "assemblies and
equipments" through a centralized monitoring system. In the same report,
however, GAO recommended that the Selected Item Reporting (SIR) system,
instituted by the Bureau of Naval Weapons and managed by ASO be improved
and refined to provide more accurate information on critical and expensive
items that are difficult to control, such as items that are easily remov-
able from aircraft and equipment that is optional and not necessarily in-
stalled on all the applicable aircraft. The SIR system is a completely
decentralized system offering no closed accounting for of assets whatever.
Recommendations such as these made the 1962 report difficult to reconcile
with current and proposed programs of the aviation supply segment of the
Navy.
As a result of these and other criticisms the Congress imposed severe
budgetory cuts in the fiscal year 1963 funds required for spare parts in
the aeronautical segment of the Navy supply system. It can be said that
this action caused the Office of Naval Material to commence a study of
8high-value item management at the Aviation Supply Office j the Office
of the Navy Comptroller to direct an "Audit of Selected Phases of the
o
Repairable Items Program of the Naval Aviation Supply Systems and the
Commanding Officer of the Aviation Supply Office to direct a study of
7Department of the Navy. Bureau of Naval Weapons Instruction 4440* 1A ;
Selected Item Reporting (SIR) . (Washington; 29 September 1961).
Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Material Letter of
30 August 1962s High Value Item Management Review of the Aviation Supply
Office .
9
Department of the Navy, Aviation Supply Offices Report of the
Non-RFI Material Study Group
.
(December, 1962), p. 1.
10Department of the Navy, Commanding Officer, Aviation Supply Office
Memorandum of 13 August 1962; Precept for Study of High-Value Material
Management Policies and Procedures .

first time such severe budgetary cuts had been imposed by Congress based
on uAO reports of inadequate control of high-value assets.
The ASO study is the most significant of the above Navy actions.
It was a two stage study designed to (a) develop an immediate program
to improve and/or correct the deficiencies in the then existing high-
value management programs, and (b) to begin development of an asset con-
trol system which would in fact provide the accountability and control
of high-value assets so much desired by the Navy as well as outside au-
diting and reviewing agencies.
The first stage of the ASO study is of little interest in this
appraisal in that it merely substantiated findings of previous studies
and recommended clean-up of existing data available to ASO commodity
managers (managers of a grouping or range of items possessing similar
applications and/or characteristics, or which are susceptible to similar
management methods), and intensive instruction to commodity managers in
the proper use of the relatively inadequate and/or extremely complex data
available from the then existing inventory reporting systems. The develop-
ment of an asset control system in the second stage of the ASO study will
be examined in detail later in this appraisal.
There has long been a widely held belief, in some parts of the Navy,
that the degree of asset control desired by GAO, and of late the Depart-
ment of Defense, can not be obtained without resultant costs exceeding
the value of the asset knowledge gained. The SIR system, superimposed
over existing inventory reporting systems and requiring a myriad of
special reports, was cited as an example of this. The costs of obtaining
The Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Weapons Instruction
ZtMO.l ; Selected Item Reporting (SIR) . Washington; circa April I960.

better asset knowledge must be considered in relation to its worth in
budget, procurement, distribution and disposal determinations and decis-
sions. Any savings which might result from a more complete knowledge
and utilization of assets must exceed the costs of the control system
employed to obtain such knowledge and utilization. A concern for system
costs is evidenced throughtout the ASO development of a control system
for high-value assets. It was realized that Navy accounting techniques
did not permit specific measurements for such costs and savings; however,
cost data as was available, coupled with intuitive estimates, statistical
projections, etc. were to be used by the system designers.
The Office of Naval Material review of high-value management, in
addition to providing assistance and information to ASO, resulted in the
12publication of a High Value Item Management Policy Manual for the Navy.
This manual is directed to the entire spectrum of inventory management of
high-value items. As such, it includes policy for control of high=/alue
assets. Specifics of this policy will be examined in detail later.
Any inquiry into the control of high-value secondary items in the
Navy, should, of course, refer to the practices and policies of the Army
and Air Force in this regard. Accordingly, a somewhat cursory examination
of high-value item management in these services, with particular emphasis
on control of such items, will be included in the appraisal.
The intricate, complex and expensive weapons of today, more than ever,
require effective support. Because of the expense involved it is only by
judicious husbanding of our resources that we can expect to maximize our
12Department of the Navy, Secretary of the Navy_ Instruction P4449.29,
High Value Item Management Policy Manual,"twashington; 18 June 1963 )
.

support within the funds available. This means there must be an effective,
economical accounting control system for those assets, wherein we have
invested the bulk of our funds. Control of assets provides knowledge;
the knowledge of asset position and coi dition which is prerequisite to
effective support. Some of the ramifications of obtaining this control




HIGH VALUE ITEM MANAGEMENT POLICY
The HI-PRI program, established in 1958 by the Aviation Supply Office,
is probably the first specialized management program for high-value items
13in the aeronautical segment of the Navy Supply System. At least seven
ASO, and ASO Field, instructions were issued in rapid succession in the
implementation of this program. Because of this myriad of instructions
further individual references to them will not be made. These instructions
cover all aspects of inventory management from procurement to disposal,
including physical inventory policy.
The initial selection of HI-PRI items was made from that group of
items carried under fraction code "H" (material under this code is sub-
ject to scheduled repair or rework by designated industrial air stations)
.
§
HI-PRI items were removed from "H" fraction and designated as "Q" fraction
to indicate that the item was subject to special management under the HI-PRI
program. Criteria for initial item selection for HI-PRI was based on in-
dividual item stock position, application, and value of any anticipated re-
quirements. Under this selection criteria, an expensive left hand aileron
assembly for a given aircraft could be "Q" fraction] whereas, the equally
expensive right hand aileron assembly for the same aircraft would be "H"
fraction merely because its stock position at the time of selection was
better than that of the left hand aileron assembly, therefore, the value
of its anticipated requirements fell below the cut off point for "Q"
fraction. This inconsistency was carried even further in cases of split





(Philadelphia, 11 July 1958).
11

effectivety and interchangeability. A fixation on stock number manage-
ment versus physical item management could have been the underlying cause
for this item selection policy. Tunnel vision could have an an effect
also in that consideration was given only to the in-house ICP effects of
the policy, disregarding the effect on the field. Why should the left
hand aileron be stored separately from the right hand aileron? Separate
handling and storage is a requirement of the HI-PRI program. Segregated
stock records make this selection policy seem even more suspect.
The HI-PRI plan greatly extended the stock status reporting base
for the items concerned. It in effect required some sort of stock status
report from every Naval activity, including ships and the Fleet Marine
Force, holding "Q" fraction items in store for issue to consumers. These
reports were graduated in frequency and depth. Continental stock status
reporting (SSR) activities, primarily Class "A" and "B" air stations, and
the two tidewater Naval Supply Centers originally submitted daily active
item stock status reports on "Q" fraction items, via the most rapid data
transmission available to them at the time. Continental (SSR) activities
and extra-continental (SSR) activities not on a rapid data transmission
network originally submitted weekly active item stock status reports.
These activities now submit transaction reports. The remaining shore
activities report only the on-hand element of stock status (for all con-
ditions of material held) for "Q" fraction on a monthly basis. Ships and
Fleet Marine Force units report inventory on hand (all conditions) on a
quarterly basis. Reports from the SSR activities are consolidated and
requirements computations are made based on the consolidated reports.
The monthly and quarterly reports from the non-SSR activities, ships and
Fleet Marine Force units are consolidated, listed and made available to
12

commodity managers. No firm or written guidelines as to what the com-
modity manager is to use these reports for has been found.
There are many other facets to the HI-PRI plan such as special
labels, expedited handling, special requisitioning channels, quarterly
physical inventory, etc. For our purposes in examing control, item se-
lection and reporting are most significant. What really makes an item
fall into a high-value category, and how can more timely, accurate and
extensive reports gain the desired control of high-value items? The HI-
PRI plan, although a progressive step, certainly can not be classed as
a control system. It did, and still does, provide more current asset
knowledge at any given time, but it does not close the loop of control.
HT-PRI does not provide the womb to tomb control of assets required for
complete accountability of high-value items.
Selected Item Reporting (SIR) is the first attempt to account for
and control the movement of high value items in the Navy. Its purpose
was to establish a system of reporting and accounting for selected items
of aeronautical material installed in aircraft and/or otherwise in use
in place or in store. The original instruction establishing the SIR pro-
gram was issued jointly in May of I960 by the Bureau of Naval Weapons
and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. The instruction we refer to
superceded the original instruction as of 29 September 1961 and though
issued by BuWeps, and signed by the then acting chief, RADM W.A. Schoech,
it was also countersigned by RADM J.W. Crumpaeker, Chief, Bureau of Sup-
plies and Accounts. The joint issuance of the original and the joint
signing of the superceeding instruction was purportedly to add status to
the program.
BuWeps Instruction 4440.1 0g. Cit . pp. 1-4, ends. 1-5
13

It is difficult to trace the development of this program. It is
known that originally the entire program was to be a BuWeps program and
to be administered by or through that bureau. Criticisms of BuWeps in-
ventory management of its "V" cognizance material furnished the impetus
for a system of control of this material, most of which could be classed
as high value. At a point late in the development of the program a
decision was made to include "R" cognizance material (aeronautical items
under the inventory management of ASO) in the SIR program. Some of the
"R" cognizance items would be transferred to "V" cognizance and some
would come into the program as "R",cog. Here, as in RT-PRI, there ap-
peared to be little concern for the effect on the field in this chang-
ing of the stock numbers (a cognizance change, though not a stock num-
ber change per se, requires similar manipulations throughout the supply
system as does a change in the basic stock number). In addition to
cognizance changes, all stock numbers for the items in the SIR program
were to be assigned a special SIR technical supply management code
(TSMC) composed of the letters SIR and a fourth character for in-
ternal control purposes; the letters SIR were for program identi-
fication. In addition to the foregoing there is special handling,
storage, marking, etc. required for SIR items.
It is interesting to note that the criteria for selection of the
original SIR items was apparently never formalized. Some were items for
which the Office of Analysis and Review required material planning studies
(DD764's), the majority were not. The initial selection included inte-
gral parts of aircraft such as wings. In most cases the items had a high-
unit price although some were priced as low as $100.
1




As noted previously, the original SIR program was to be managed by
BuWepsj however, at an undetermined date just prior to scheduled imple-
mentation of the program on 1 July I960 a decision was made to have ASO
assume management of the SIR program. The system as designed was not
compatible with ASO systems management but the program was implemented
on schedule. For the first two months field activities were required to
replenish by pulling (placing requisitions on ASO) stocks of SIR
16
material. This fact alone reveals how unprepared ASO was to accept
the job. ASO had for many years operated a push system of resupply for
its stock points. The peculiar SIR TSMC could not be handled in the ASO
computer system. Accordingly, there was a two month delay in developing
systems for handling SIR items.
The requirement to report SIR items installed in aircraft by their
applicable stock number turned out to be an almost impossible task. The
installed records were maintained by the Fleet Aviation Accounting Offices
and designated shore stations by individual stock numbers. The absolute
requirement that receipts, turn-ins, surveys, etc. match by stock number
was a nightmare for all hands. The wings mentioned earlier had been
procured as an insurance item early in the life of the applicable air-
craft program and as a routine practice aircraft service changes were
not incorporated in spares of this nature until a requirement existed.
Because of this none of the installed wings could be related to the
stock number of the wings in store. All installed wings had, of course,
been changed and modified many times over by aircraft service changes.
16
Department of the Navy, Aviation Supply Office letter of 12 July
I960: Planning and Control Conference , 14-15 June 1960$ summary of
15

One item, the afterburner assembly used on the J-65 engine when installed
in an F-ll F aircraft, had twenty two stock numbers. Depending on main-
tenance practices, the stock number of this item could change while the
aircraft was undergoing a burner check in squadron maintenance merely
because of application of a different holding assembly. The gyro in the
central air data computer system of the F4H aircraft was a SIR item.
This item is buried inside of the main frame of the computer. Operators
were not happy about opening up a functioning computer to see what kind
of gyro was inside. The above are only a few of the problems encountered
in operation of the SIR system.
As a result of these and other problems ASO, assisted by BuWeps,
developed some system changes in an effort to make the program pay off.
Along with the system changes was a formal statement of policy regarding
ASO management of the SIR program. In part, BuVleps policy is that ASO
is assigned the responsibility and authority for administering the SIR
program within the parameters of guidelines contained in the revised in-
struction and in accordance with any subsequent policies issued by BuWeps.
Included as policy was the authority for ASO to issue and/or modify SIR
procedures based on operating experience and the authority to police,
17
check and verify reports submitted under the program.
The major system changes made were the adoption of a Master Equip-
ment Number (MEN) for SIR items installed/in use or in place, the re-
moval of the SIR-TSMC with concomittant return of the normally applic-
able TSMC for the item concerned, and the adoption of the fraction code
"G" to denote SIR in the same manner that the fraction code "Q" denotes
HI-PRI.
17
'BuWeps Instruction 4440. 1A, og. cit
.
, enclosure 1, p. 2,
16

The net effect of the above changes was to establish reporting re-
quirements based on three categories of material — installed/in use,
in place or in store. These categories of material and the method of
18
reporting can be described as follows i
Reporting Category and Method
Installed/in use —
By Master Equipment Number (MEN)
(No condition code) to the appropriate Fleet
Aviation Accounting Office (FAAO) or designated
stock status reporting activity.
In Place —
By Master Equipment J umber (MEN)
(Preceded by an appropriate condition code)
to the appropriate FAAO or designated
stock status reporting activity
Material
Material installed in air-
craft or otherwise in use





By Federal Stock Number (With appropriate
condition code) to the Aviation Supply
Office in accordance with normal stock status
reporting procedures or to a designated stock
status reporting activity for transmittal to
the Aviation Supply Office.
Material in place in ships,
Air FMF units, prepositioned
in the hands of users, in
rotatable pools (O&R's, AMD's
etc.) bench sets, training
devices and the like held on
custody for accountable
officers. This also inclu-
des material in packups,
fly-away kits, etc. not




terial (GFM) held by con-
tractors for installation
in end articles not yet
accepted by the Navy; and
material held by contrac-
tors for commercial over-
haul, rework, modification,
etc.
Material "in store" in
store account 52000 in the
custody of an accountable
officer. SIR material may
not be carried in "three
digit" accounts.
The change from the SIR-TSMC to a regular system TSMC and the
18
BuV.eps Instruction 4440. 1A. op. cit ; enclosure 1, pp. 2-3
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adoption of the "G" fraction code was done primarily to permit assimi-
lation of SIR items into the Navy aviation supply system ADP management
techniques. The new format, or rather return to the regular format, of
the SIR stock number now permitted requirements computations, industrial
forecasts, etc., to be made on SIR items using proven computer systems
techniques. It also facilitated field management, particularly in the
large mechanized activities. The aviation supply system, and partic-
ularly the Bureau of Naval Weapons, should have learned much from this
abortive attempt to alter an existing stock numbering system rather than
to adopt the system to the purpose at hand. It is impractical to attempt
to cost a stock number change, but everyone in management should realize
that a single stock number change of any kind, beginning with the frac-
tion code through the technical supply management code, can trigger hun=
reds, perhaps thousands, of individual actions through-out the system.
In the case of SIR, at least the first set of stock number changes could
have been avoided.
The utilization of a Master Equipment Number is merely a recognition
of the facts of life, namely that federal stock numbers are non-signif-
icant and have no meaning whatever to operators. The Master Equipment
Number is a significant method of identifying equipment. For the most
part Master Equipment Numbers are numbers normally found on name plates,
in technical publications, etc. They are generally composed of such as
installation letters, type of equipment numerical indicators, purpose
letters, model numbers, modification sequence, components, set, or unit
indicators, etc. Typical Master Equipment Numbers and their composition
19
19
BuWeps Instruction 4440. 1A ojd. cit.; enclosure 1, pp. 2-3
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The use of the above numbering system permitted the grouping together of
SIR items which were interchangeable as to form, fit and/or function
under one Master Equipment Number. The operator is now concerned with
only 128 significant Master Equipment Numbers (most of them already
20
familiar to, and used daily by him) instead of 373 Federal Stock Numbers.
The SIR system has remained basically unchanged since incorporation
of the above changes. As a result of the changes it is a system that
can be lived with, though not necessarily liked. The degree of validity
and reliability of asset data is still below that required in the man-
agement of this type of material. ASO, the inventory manager, still has
difficulty in accounting for the total assets of the material concerned.
This seems to be primarily due to leakage in the reporting system. Ma-
terial has a tendency to get lost when moving between fleet activities,
shore activities, contractors, etc. Losses also occur in repair/rework
cycles in Overhaul and Repair activities and in Aircraft Maintenance De-
partments. In view of this the value and accuracy of the asset data is
questionable in view of the cost of administering the system. In other
21
words "the means ought to be proportioned to the ends."
21Alexander Hamilton. The Federalists.
19

The magnitude of the management resources applied in the Air Force
HI-VaLU progrc-m is impressive. Lack of utilization of ADP in program
management is significant, particularly when there is no dearth of ADF
equipment in the Air Force. Admittedly management of high-value items
requires a much higher degree of human judgement than other inventory
categories; however, the validity of human judgements can be increased
if the knowledge of assets can be made more current and correct through
automation.
Before reviewing the Air Force HI-VALU program and its effectiveness
in achieving the degree of asset knowledge desired by GAO and DOD, it is
appropriate to reiterate the definition of accounting control as used in
this study. For purposes of this study control implies knowledge of total
asset position in order that budget, procurement, distribution, and dis-
posal determinations and decisions can be made as accurately as possible.
This is not the sense in which the Air Force uses the term. This can
best be explained by the fact that the Air Force suffered just as severe
budget cuts, proportionally, as did the Navy in Fiscal Year 1963 due to
their inability to "account" for material. In the words of GAO this
system also lacks "accounting controls necessary to keep account of the
quantities and locations of its stocks of high-value repairable assemblies
and equipment."
As mentioned previously there is no doubt that the Air Force has made
an early and tremendous effort in the field of high-value management.
Probably most significant here is the fact that the Air Force HI-VALU
program is a total program, a command program permeating all echelons of
management including operators. For instance, Command HI-VALU Program




Supply Officer, Maintenance Officer, etc. A typical Air Force base
23
HI-VALU organization is composed of the following personnels
a. HI-VALU Program Control Officer
b. HI-VALU Requirements Control Officer
c. HI-VALU Maintenance Control Officer
d. HI-VALU Procurement and Production Control Officer
e. HI-VALU Comptroller Control Officer
f
.
HI-VALU Assistant for Programming Control Officer
g. HI-VALU Quality Control Officer
The magnitude of the Air Force HI-VALU effort can best be typified by
the amount of effort applied in Air Force Project MBIT. This project is
the Air Force extension of the DOD Project SHAKEDOWN, a standardization
of Federal Stock Numbers in federal class and group 2815 as applied to
like items in the Navy and Air Force. Under SHAKEDOWN, item character-
istics are developed which permit a federal type la item description
for cataloging purposes. It can be said that a good type la description
permits everyone to identify like items to the same federal stock num-
ber. Managers of some technical inventories have commonly used type 2
descriptions which reflect only such things as specification/drawing
numbers, manufactures part numbers, etc. with no attempt to describe
the item in a standard manner as in type la. The reduction of stock
numbers under SHAKEDOWN has been outstanding. In view of this, the Air
22
Department of the Air Force, Air Force Spares Study Group
;
Improving HI-VALU Operations at A F Bases, (Hq. Air Material Command
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; June 1957) p. 7.
23
Department of the Air Force, Air Force Spares Study Group
Check Up On Your HL.VALU Operations . (Hq. Air Materiel Command
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; June 1957) p. 7.
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Force extended this type of review, under the name of MINT, to all Air
Force items and budgeted 1500 man years to the first year's work.
This gives evidence to the depth of resources available in the Air Force
to carry out a given effort. On the basis of MINT, it is reasonable to
assume that the resources applied to HI-VALU have been significantly
larger.
The selection of items for HI-VALU is very formalized and deliberate.
Each HI-VALU item is so designated by a formal board known as the HI-VALU
Review Board for a given weapon system. Review boards consider each item
based on a combination of unit cost, total line item procurement under
consideration, usage cost, and/or essentiality to the Air Force mission.
The HI-VALU Review Board not only selects items for initial inclusion in
the HI-VALU program, but continues to maintain surveilance of them
through-out the life of the program concerned. This is done through the
media of HI-VALU Review Board Meetings at specified intervals, but never
less than annually. There were about 8,000 master items in the HI-VALU
program in 1963 . This means 20,000 stock numbered items at 2.5 to 1
ratio of stock numbers to master items. Navy experience in repairables
indicates that an overall ratio of stock numbers to master items of 2.5
to 1 is most conservative. The ratio in electronics items is considered
to be higher. As of I960 approximately $1,353*736,471 or 67$ of the
money value of Air Force Master Repair Schedules was in HI-VALU items.
Returning to the subject of control, it is of interest to note a
development of a procedure to obtain information on HI-VALU assets in
department of Defense, Defense Supply Agency, Report on the
Management of Aeronautical Materiel Within the Department of Defense
^Volume
[
jjfj ^Washington; January, 1964) . p. 207.
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an intransit status. In the Air Force, as in the Navy, items were
dropped from stock records when shipped and were lost to the system
until picked up on stock records at the point of receipt. This meant
that some assets did not appear on any records at certain times and
were not taken in consideration when computing or reviewing requirements.
The Air Force solution was to close this gap. This was done by requiring
that the shipping activity retain the quantity on its stock records until
an agreed upon date had been reached, at which time the receiving activ-
25ity would assume accountability and reporting responsibilities. In
other words this procedure purports to eliminate material float between
activities. The administration of this could be a problem if the material
concerned failed to get to the right place at the right time. However,
so long as the Air Force continues their present asset and consumption
reporting system, called the Stock Balance and Consumption Report, this
system appears to have some merit.
The literature available indicates that the Air Force has not been
able to overcome the problem of un-accountable losses of assets even
26
though the HI-VALU program has been in effect for many years. Their
problems, as one might suspect, are in the accounting, inventory and
reporting phases of their HI-VALU inventory control program. At the
present time the Air Force Stock Balance and Consumption Report is sub-
mitted semi-annually with cut off dates of 15 April and 15 October of
27
each year, with a planned future frequency of monthly or quarterly.
25
^Dale L. Walther, An Evaluation of the Air Force HI-VALU Program
.
(Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington: 1959). p. 16
2°DSA, Report on the Management of Aeronautical Material Vol. V
op . cit . p. 13
'DSA, Report on the Management of Aeronautical Material Vol. V
0£. cit. p. 275
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In addition to the semi-annual Stock Balance and Consumption Reports,
asset balances only are reported as of 15 January and 15 July. HI-VALU
item reports must be submitted to arrive at the respective Inventory
Manager within 24 days after the "as of" date. Of the 516 reports made
on the October 1962 reporting cycle 191 were late. Stock Balance and
Consumption Reports are considered only 50$ accurate by Headquarters,
28
Air Force Logistics Command. This is difficult to measure, but it is
based primarily on auditors reports and from comparing one Stock Balance
and Consumption Report with another. The consolidated Stock Balance and
Consumption Reports are not available until some ten weeks after the re~
29
port cut-off date. Aside from the obvious error problem the timeliness
of these reports is hardly appropriate for HI-VALU management. Because
of the inadequacies of the Stock Balance and Consumption Report the Air
Force inventory managers are expected to use derived assets in the ap=
30plication of assets to gross requirements computations. These assets
are developed by inventory managers as the difference between total sys-
tem assets at the start of the period less reported issues, with the re-
sults being the assets which should be in the system as of the end of
the reporting period. The difference, if any, between total assets re-
ported on the Stock Balance and Consumption Report and those developed
by the inventory manager are identified as derived assets and also are
23;DSA, Report on the Management of Aeronautical Material Vol. V.
op. cit. p. 299.
29
DSA, Report on the Management of Aeronautical Material Vol. V.
loc . cit .
30
DSA, Report on the Management of Aeronautical Material Vol. V.
°E» cit . p. 258.
24

included in netting out the gross requirement. In other words they do
just about what an inventory manager at the Aviation Supply Office does
when he computes a procurement
Increased training and increased staffing has been the Air Force
approach to solution of the above problems. It would appear that they
have a system design problem, as does the Navy. Without a workable
system of asset accountability and movement control neither service can
expect to gain the degree of asset knowledge required for effective man-
agement of HI-VALU items.
The Army has a program in being for the management of what they call
Super High Dollar Value items. These are items selected by the Army
Material Command for world-wide asset reporting and comprehensive supply
control studies based on the importance of the item, a significant in-
vestment in inventory, and/or high unit price. As late as September
1963 seventy four items were designated Super High Dollar Value and plans
were being made to merge the monthly asset reporting system for these
32items with the daily system in use for engines. It could not be deter-
mined from the literature available as to whether the new system would
be on a transaction reporting basis or on an active items basis, nor
whether reports would be generated below what the Army refers to as major
overseas depot level.
31
DSA, Report on the Management of Aeronautical Material Vol. 3.
op . cit . p. 23.
32
Department of the Army, Supply Maintenance Command, Aviation
Material Maintenance Improvement Program Progress Report Quarter
Ending 30 September 1963. p. C-l.
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The fact that the Array includes assets at all levels down to and
including the user level when computing requirements does not neces-
sarily indicate a real knowledge of those assets. This may explain
Army testing of a new initial inventory model encompassing those ele-
ments necessary to properly reflect world-wide assets and to meet re-
33
quirements of DOD as well as G/0.
The Army position is that their distribution system, based on cen-
tralized requisitioning, provides adequate asset information for use in
requirements computation, therefore, there is no need for a special
asset and consumption reporting system. Apparently this position could
not hold-up in the face of the pressure by the Department of Defense
through the Aviation Material Management Improvement Program. The Army
net depot method of requirements computation is based on the assumption
that all pipelines below depot level are full, therefore issue from the
depot represent true replenishable demand for using units within the
Army. This method, in reality, considers only depot assets and issues.
The magnitude of the Army problem should rapidly increase as their
air arm continues to grow in size and complexity of aircraft. Fortunate-
ly they may have time to develop a workable asset control system while
the numbers of items to control are still small. Experience on a small
scale should enable the Army to easily expand to a larger scale system
without encountering the problems that the Navy and Air Force have en-
countered.
33
Ibid , p. C-7.
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DEVELOPMENT OF A HIGH VALUE ASSET CONTROL
PROGRAM BY THE AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICE
In 1962 the Aviation Supply Office undertook the development of a system
/
designed to provide accurate, timely, and complete knowledge and control
of designated high-value items held in stores accounts and suspense
accounts by 149 activities afloat and ashore, held in place in 700 ac-
tivities through-out the world, and held by some 300 activities in
special situations and installed in Naval aircraft. In so far as prac-
tical, development of this system will be traced from its inception
through completion of its prototype with subsequent recommendations.
The ground rules for development of such an asset control system
were enumerated in Chapter 1, but it should be mentioned again that the
design of the system was heavily influenced by admonitions in regard to
system cost vs system effectiveness. Another influence was the knowledge
that any system developed must be prototyped and proven before implemen-
tation. This approach was somewhat different from the usual "shoot first
and ask questions later" method of system implementation. The Department
of Defense Project 65, which evolved into the Department of Defense Aero-
nautical Material Management Improvement Program, also greatly influenced
the system design. '
At issue through-out the development of the High Value Asset Control
System was the matter of just what items would come under such a control
system should it be implemented. Although the Aviation Supply Office
35Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Logistics, "Aviation Material Management Improvement
Program", (Washington, D.C.j 17 August 1962)
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had definite views in this regard it was realized that the system under
development could well be a forerunner of a Navy wide asset control plan,
therefore, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts as well as the Office of
Navy Material, were concerned in defining the items to come under high-
value management. Both of the latter, favored a velocity/value approach
to selection. As a result the Navy will select items for special high
value managements
"(1) When during periodic review or at time of provisioning, system
stocks are to be procured and in addition;
(a) The forecast annual replenishable demand is equal to or greater
than $40,000; or the total requirement for any future 12-month
period, including outfittings and other program requirements,
is predicted to be equal to or greater than $100,000; and
(b) The procurement of new stocks is forecast in either the
apportionment or budget year, if managed routinely; or expedited
repair of recoverable material is necessary in lieu of procure-
ment .
(2) When it is planned to procure more than $100,000 worth of the
item in either the budget or apportionment year to meet end use require-
ments, and no system stocks are to be procured. — An item qualifying
under paragraph (1) above will be deleted from High Value Management
when it is expected that it will fail to meet the criteria for at least
two years. — The criteria stated in paragraphs (1) and (2) above are
not considered to be optimum criteria. - - - Inventory managers may re-
quest changes in the criteria to provide additional item coverage. .
36
Sec. Nav. High Value Item Management Policy. op_. cit . p. 2.

The above criteria seems valid for overall inventory management
purposes. Extrapolation of Table # 1 would indicate that the $40,000
replenishable figure will cover more than eighty per cent of the dollar
value (or items) of replenishable demand for repairablcs under ASO man-
agement. Direct comparison with the Navy's estimate that one per cent
of the items in inventory will account for forty per cent of the annual
dollar investment is not possible due to the fact that replenishable
demand in repairable spare parts does not necessarily indicate a buy
requirement. However, experience does indicate that the estimate is
valid.
Navy policy for high-value item management also calls for activities
designated as stock status reporting activities by cognizant inventory
managers to report changes in condition or location of high-value items
on a transaction basis. Depending on the mode of data transmission,
Navy inventory managers will receive such transaction reports on a daily
basis as a minimum. Some of the larger activities may make transaction
reports several times a day. It is interesting to note the difference
between this reporting policy and that of the Air Force. Assuming the
same error rate for both, the Navy with its current asset data, should
be in a much better management position than the Air Force with its
old asset data.
While all of the above is interesting it did not directly affect
the design of the High Value Asset Control system at the Aviation Supply
Office. However, it should be realized that item selection means a lot
when trying to sell a program such as this to the field. The High Value




Material Management Policies and Procedures Study Group (refered to
hereafter as the High Value Study Group) found that faulty initial item
selection had a profound and detrimental effect in field supply activ-
ities and with operators. Shortly after implementation of the SIR
program a review was made of the items initially selected and almost
39
fifty per cent of them were deleted and replaced by new items. The
Hi-Pri system started life with large material excesses contrary to
40
stated management policy. As noted earlier there has always been con-
siderable movement of items into and out of high-value management pro-
grams. In some cases such movement can probably be justified, but de-
cisions in this area should only be made at a very high management level
after due consideration of all facts. Experience would indicate that it
is best to start small and grow cautiously in systems such as these.
The High Value Study Group was primarily concerned with just what
items should be totally controlled and accounted for through-out all
echelons of the Navy. In studying this problem they analyzed such things
as replenishable demand/velocity value , inventory investment, military
essentiality, etc. (see Table #1 for an analysis of velocity value).
Only the Master Control File (Repairables) was studied. This file
accounted for approximately $1.3 billion of the total aeronautical in-
ventory investmentof $2.3 billion in 1962. In view of this, the limiting
-^Department of the Navy, Aviation Supply Office, High-Value
Material Management Policies and Procedures Study, Phase 1 Report
,
(Philadelphia s 4 September 1952) p. 2.
39
ASO, High Value Material Management Study, Phase 1 Report loc. cit.
40,ASO High Value Material Management
s
Phase 1 Report loc. cit.
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of their analyses to this inventory appears most valid. Tables #2 and
#3 are summaries of some of the machine listings and calculations made
in the course of the study. Few inventory management sophisticates are
surprised that a relatively small percentage of items account for the
majority of sales. This relationship is invariably found in any in-
ventory and the ratio value increases as the technical complexity of
the items increases. It is the relationship of unit price to inventory
investment , replenishable demand/velocity value, and military essen-
tiality that some people find difficult to believe. The Aviation Supply
Office studies (see Tables #2 and #3) proved conclusively that high unit
price is closely correlated with high inventory investment and high re-
plenishable demand/velocity value as well as high military essentiality,,
This relation is most significant for asset control purposes. Since
total asset control must go to the lowest echelon there is a need for a
standard that anyone can understand. The standardf, in this case is high
unit price. Everyone understands the meaning of money when related to a
specific item at hand. The mere fact that an item is expensive is reason
enough for special care. Whether the item has a velocity value of
$40,000 or $4,000,000 is of little interest to the average sailor or
GS-4 stock clerk. This high unit price approach to item selection for
accounting control of assets has been accepted and is now Navy Department
41
policy. It is significant to us that this appears to be the first
official recognition that accounting for certain assets can be accomplised
as an independent part of an overall special inventory management program.
The asset accounting or control system merely ensures the validity of
input into the management system.
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The timing of the decision to develop a High Value Asset Control
system was most fortuitous . Transaction reporting from stock status
reporting activities to ASO using NAVSTRIP (NAVSANDA Publication 408)
as a base, had been developed for "G" and "Q" fraction material, and
ASO had received an IBM 1405 Random Access Storage Unit for test use
with one of the IBM HOI computers then on board .^2 NAVSTRIP provided
the needed standard vehicle for control, and random access equipment was
capable of reacting to the requirements of an accounting control system.
The next action was actual development of a prototype High Value
Asset Control system designed to take advantage of the improved facili-
ites for nechanized accumulation and processing of system exchange data.
The real challenge was to establish an unbroken chain of accounting con-
trol, complete with audit trail, through existing Navy and Marine Corps
logistic support channels,, The lack of audit trail and the requirement
for special reports outside of normal logistic actions were major weak-
nesses in the SIR program. The High Value Asset Control system was
designed to provide accounting control of each segment of inventory,
even though the material handling and control functions required between
the point of removal of an unserviceable item and its ultimate return to
serviceable condition, disposal, replacement from purchase, etc. are
fragmented into many echelons of the logistics system. Table #3 is in-
Application of Transaction Reporting and Random Access Data Processing
Equipment to the Management of High Value Material
, (23 March 1962) «, p. 1.
^ASO High Value Material Management Study, Phase 1 Report.
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dicative of some of the many transactions applicable to high value items.
The prototype system was to incorporate as much as possible of what
would be desired in a final system if implementation proved feasible.
This meant that the system must give results which would meet the re-
quirements of existing and/or proposed inventory management systems.
For instancy all computer outputs from the control system applicable to
the Aviation Supply Office Single Requirements Determination System must
be in the proper format. It also meant that new assets would be available
for use in requirements computation and that management must adjust pro-
cedures to accept these new assets. By-products of the system would pro-
vide such things as production data by individual item at individual
Overhaul and Repair facilities, monitoring of reaction time to shipment
directives, measurement of in-transit time between activities, exchange
time between issuance of an item to a user and receipt of a like or
interchangeable unserviceable item from that user, etc. System mon-
itoring was programed on an exception basis. Standards were set for
completion of given transactions. If these standards were met there
would be no management action required. However, if the standards were
not met the computer would "ring bells and blow whistles" and print out
the details of the transaction for review and action by a member of a
proposed asset control group. In some cases it was planned to have the
computer print out an exception report which would go to all concerned
as well as to the next senior activity.
Looking at Table #3 it is easy to follow the type of transactions
involved in the accounting control system. For example, look at sample
transaction number 5, Issue to squadron, exchange item required. B0A
in columns 1-3 indicates to the computer that NAS Quonset Point (columns
35

67-69) has issued an exchange item to a squadron (columns 31-35) on
Julian date 3130 (columns 77-80), An offsetting transaction (see trans-
action number 6) must be received and matched within 5 days or an ex-
ception will be printed out. The exception of course, gives all known
details of the transaction. It is interesting to note than in this
specific case the advertised standard for issue and return of an ex-
changeable item is 3 days; however, the computer is programmed to allow
5 days in order to accomodate possible delays in processing and/or
transmission and thus make the exception system less "nervous". This
computer record is known as the HI-VAC Potential Recovery Record and may
be called for by item, by activity when desired, by commodity managers. *
Assets in this record are classed as In Store assets and are used in re-
quirements computation.
The In Store account mentioned above is the primary inventory
account. This account contains all material held in store for issue to
users, awaiting repair, etc. In addition, this account contains the HI-
VAC Potential Recovery Record mentioned above and the HI-VAC In-Transit
Record. The In-Place account contains the HI-VAC Commercial Overhaul
Record, test bench installations, Government Furnished Material, etc.
The Special Account is primarily historical and provides the HI-VAC Asset
History Record. Such things as sales/transfers to other Governments or
Agencies, losses, condemnations, cumulative procurements, etc. are
^Department of the Navy, Aviation Supply Office, HI-VAC Prototype
Report
.
(Philadelphia : August 1963). p. 6.
Material Management Improvement Program Quarterly Progress Report
for the Quarter Ending j>0 September 19&3 . pp. 1-5.
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contained in this account. All records are maintained by item, by-
activity and each item/activity record must always balance.
Programing of the 1401/1405 computer system was completed about
1 May, 1963. Debugging of the program was accomplished to a limited
degree by use of dummy data. Activities selected for the prototype run
were NAS Quonset Point, NAS Brunswick, NAS Johnsville, NAS Willow Grove,
NAS Norfolk, USS Intrepid, and USS RANDOLPH.^ The degree of interaction
between these activities as well as the type of operation was a prime
concern in their selection. The prototype, originally scheduled for 30
days, later extended to 60 days, beginning 17 May, 1963 had to provide
sufficient information to establish the validity of audit trails in and
among these activities. All activities were visited several times by
the High Value Study Group. Some internal procedures at NAS Quonset
Point and NAS Norfolk required standardization for the prototype.
These changes related primarily to the Overhaul and Repair cycle. The
study group had found in the course of system development that no two
Overhaul and Repair activities progress material undergoing repair in
the same manner. For the period of the prototype Quonset Point and
Norfolk agreed to standardize their systems. Clarification of NAVSTRIP
data accounted for the majority of the groups time with prototype ac-
tivities. Error rates were very high in the transaction reports being
received in ASO at that time. HI-PRI items ("Q" fraction) were the
inventory segment concerned in the prototype. This meant that the stock
46
Department of the Navy, Aviation Supply Office, High Value Asset
Control Prototype
, (17 May - 14 June 1963). p.l.
**-'AS0, High Value Asset Control Prototype, o£. cit . p. 2.
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status reporting activities (NAS Quonset Point, Brunswick and Norfolk,
and NSC Norfolk) would not have to change normal reporting procedures
to any degree. No changes of any kind were required of NSC Norfolk.
Transaction reports from these activities were duplicated at ASO as
they came off the transceiver, one set went to regular processing, the
second set was assimilated with reports from Johnsville, Willow Grove,
Intrepid and Randolph and processed through the 1401/1405 High Value
Asset Control program.
The prototype ran from 17 May until 12 July 1963. Sixty four per
cent of the transactions received during this period cleared a machine
validation run and were accepted and processed through the 1401/1405
HIVAC program. Analysis of those transactions not accepted showed that
they were rejected due to procedural problems such as (a) obligations
against a "Z" (material requiring repair/rework, not ready for issue)
condition stock record when the computer was programmed to accept
obligations against RFI (material ready for issue) stock records only,
(b) inadequate project codes and routing identifiers in NAVSTRIP, (c)
duplicate document numbers in Overhaul and Repair transactions, (d)
field errors, (e) errors attributed to interface problems with other
than prototype activities, and "acceptable" errors (those transactions
printed out for review before processing due to constraints in the
computer program) . All errors except those attributed to interface
problems with non-prototype activities were corrected and successfully
reintroduced into the computer program.
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The assumption that material could be accounted for with a closed
transaction reporting system monitored by a high speed random access
computer was proved valid. The system balanced item accounts by activity
and system, and provided audit trails for all transactions. The High
Value Study Group reported in part —
~
This system will meet the requirements of the AMMIP Program and
will make possible a more definitive reply to GAO and other
investigating teams. It also generally follows the Uniform
Inventory Control Point system, as well as the recently published
SECNAVINST P4440.29. In addition , it will make available to the
commodity manager a more complete knowledge of the location of
all assets, and thus may reduce - - or cancel - - procurements.
The HIVAC system as designed is workable in most cases,
V/ith the success of the protype ASO established a HIVAC Implemen-
50
tation Group . This group was directed to coordinate its efforts with
those of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts and the other Navy Inven-
tory Control Points and to attempt to make the HIVAC system compatible
with the BuS&A HICAR system, a high cost asset reporting system under
development at that time. Their aim was to insure that ASO would not
lose the intelligence gained through HIVAC when the Uniform Inventory
Control Point procedures were made effective. The group was also
directed to discuss with the Bureau of Naval Weapons the cancellation
of the SIR program. It is presumed that both SIR and HI-PRI will be
cancelled with the inception of HIVAC.
ASO, High Value Asset Control Prototype, eg, cit. pp. 5-7
50
Department of the Navy, Aviation Supply Office, HI-VAC
Implementation Group ; establishment of, ( Philadelphia j U November 1963)
p. 1.
ASO, HI-VAC Implementation Group, oj>. cit. pp.4-5.
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VSUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
SUMMARY
In order to reduce the tremendous expenditures for aeronautical
spare parts brought about by the ever-increasing cost and complexity
of modern weapon systems all of the Military Services are using varying
degrees of selective management (management by exception principles) in
their respective logistics systems. This concept of management provides
for intensified management and control of the small number of high-value
spare parts that account for the majority of the dollars invested in
inventory. Concomittantly, the concept provides for deemphasis of con-
trols and management effort applied to the large number of spares which
are low cost and account for a relatively less significant inventory
investment. The heart of all the management programs for high-value
items has been the premise that increased control and management of
these items will result in significant dollar savings as well as in-
creased support.
Reviews of the various inventory management systems by outside
agencies such as the General Accounting Office have revealed defi-
ciencies. For the most part the deficiencies are attributed to in-
adequacies in the accounting control procedures for high-value items.
The General Accounting Office contends that due to these deficiencies
in asset control the degree of asset knowledge required for satisfactory
management of high-value material is much less than adequate, and that
as a result many thousands (in some case millions) of dollars have been
wasted.
The Army Super High Dollar Value program is relatively small in
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comparison with similar programs in the Air Force and the Navy. However,
with Army aviation expanding rapidly the Army will be soon be faced with
asset control problems such as those in the Air Force and Navy. The
Army does, however, have the time to develop an adequate control system
which can grow with their aviation program.
The degree of success of the Navy HI-PRI plan and the Navy SIR
system has been less than optimum. Both programs have problem areas
which prevent the realization of maximum possible savings through in-
creased management and control. Some of the more important problems
are:
(a) Frequent additions and deletions of items.
(b) Questionable initial item selection criteria.
(c) Item identification.
(d) Lack of audit trails within control systems.
(e) Inadequate system planning and testing prior to system
implementation
.
The ASO HIVAC program has been specifically designed to control
high-value assets. The system appears to have been designed and de-
veloped in line with recognized "system design and development" tech-
niques, ie. (a) formulation and understanding of objectives, (b) detailed
policies, procedures, specifications, etc., and (c) testing and debugging
prior to implementation.
NAVSTR1P and large scale random access data processing equipment
have significantly enhanced the ability of ASO to design procedures and
techniques for providing the precise control over high-value spares
required for their effective management. The prototype of the HIVAC
system using actual data generated by selected activities has proved
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that the basic system as designed will provide control of high-value
assets as planned.
CONCLUSIONS
The concept of selective item management has provided significant
savings through the reduction of procurements of high-value items and
through reduced management effort of low value items. While the extent
of dollar savings could be argued, inasmuch as exact savings and costs
cannot be determined, the continual decrease in capital investment in
an aeronautical spare parts inventory in relation to the continual in-
crease in capital investment in Navy active aircraft, is enough to in-
dicate that extremely significant savings are being made.
While the preciseness of control sought under the various high-value
inventory management programs has never been attained, because of unre-
solved problem areas, nevertheless, the increased attention focused on
high-value material has brought about a greater accuracy of control than
existed previously. In addition, the HI-PRI plan and the SIR system
have provided a wealth of experience upon which the Navy was able to
draw 1 designing the HIVAC system.
Criticism by the General Accounting Office in regard to inadequate
accounting control of high-value material was, to a degree, justified.
The quality of asset control required for satisfactory inventory manage-
ment of high-value assets does not exist in the Navy (or the Air Force).
Inaccurate and untimely asset reports have been the major stumbling
block to the Navy (and Air Force) in obtaining precise control over high-
value assets. In designing the HIVAC system the Navy has made a concen-
trated effort to solve this major problem. When HIVAC is implemented it
should greatly reduce, or, (hopefully) eliminate, the asset control
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problem. When this is achieved, additional savings of magnitude, as well
as increased support, should be realized.
There is obviously a need for better criteria for the selection of
items to be included in high-value management systems, in order to prevent
the frequent additions and deletions that now plague the systems. The
established policy of the Navy Department only partially recognizes this
problem in that it specifically provides only for stability of items
with a unit price of $1000 and over. The policy is that such items will
always be classed as high-value and be subject to control such as that
provided in HIVAC. This will enable ASO to have stable coverage of over
6,000 items accounting for &U% ($813M) of their repairables inventory
investment. A much less significant number of items will be covered at
other Navy Inventory Control Points. The basic criteria for inclusion
in or removal from high-value management in the Navy is predicated on
forecasts or predictions of requirements. Such a policy builds in item
migration. The state of the art of inventory management is not so high
as to prevent constant movement into and out of high-value management
when these latter criteria are used*
The basic requirement for successful asset control, the existence
of a complete audit trail, is in the HIVAC system. This, and the use
of a closed control system monitored by a central computer, should pro-
vide accurate and current asset knowledge. Such knowledge will enhance
the quality of inventory management at ASO.
The decision to test the HIVAC program by actually running a proto-
type reflects a high degree of acumen in system design and development
as well as sound management practice. If the HIVAC system is successful,




It is assumed that the highest officials in the logistics support
areas of the Military Departments and the Department of Defense are
fully aware of the problem of asset control. If the HIVAC system
proves successful when fully implemented through out the aviation seg-
ment of the Navy, immediate action should be taken to make these indi-
viduals fully cognizant of the tremedous contribution such a system can
make to the field of inventory management. Cross fertilization of ex-
cellent management inovations and ideas must be carried out with dis-
patch if their full benefits are to be obtained.
The Navy, as the Air Force has done, should permeate their
organization with a high-value management philosophy. Specialized
management should be applied to all levels and in all functions. Con-
sideration should be given to establishing "specialized repair/rework"
activites for selected high-value items. A few items have been handled
on this basis in the past with notatable success (i.e. gas turbine air
starters at MCAS Cherry Point)
.
An intensified effort should be made to develop a realistic selec-
tion criteria for items to be managed under high-value management pro-
grams. Stability of items in these programs should be a major goal of
the effort. The cost of item migration into and out of these programs
could well exceed the cost of continuing to manage the item under high-
value procedures until the time of its disposal.
A formal policy should be established which would require suitable
testing of any management information system prior to its implementation.
The definition of "suitable" depends, of course, on the systems charac-
teris :ics and magnitude of consequences. The art of designing major
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management information systems is similar to that of designing aircraft,
there can be many a slip between the block flow diagram or the drawing
board and a system which will produce the information required or an
aircraft which will meet prescribed performance characteristics. Both
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